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Abstract
We match administrative panel data on portfolio choices with sur-
vey data on preferences over ambiguity. We show that ambiguity averse
investors bear more risk, due to a lack of diversication. In particu-
lar, they exhibit a form of home bias that leads to higher exposure to
the domestic relative to the international stock market. While more
sensitive to market factors, their returns are on average higher, sug-
gesting that ambiguity averse investors need not be driven out of the
market for risky assets. We also show that these investors rebalance
their portfolio more actively and in a contrarian direction relative to
past market trends, which allows them to keep their risk exposure rel-
atively constant over time. We discuss these ndings in relation to the
theoretical literature on portfolio choice under ambiguity.
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1 Introduction
Ambiguity has been widely studied both theoretically and experimentally
in the past decades. Its implications have been investigated in a variety of
settings, including nancial behaviors.1 It is now commonly understood, at
least at an intuitive level, that ambiguity is an important element that house-
holds face in their nancial decisions (Ryan, Trumbull and Tufano (2011),
Guiso and Sodini (2013)). It may also be a key ingredient to explain the
functioning of nancial markets.2 Field evidence of how ambiguity a¤ects
households is however still very scarce:
Interestingly, the empirical literature has so far provided little ev-
idence linking individual attitudes toward ambiguity to behavior
outside the lab. Are those agents who show the strongest degree
of ambiguity aversion in some decision task also the ones who
are most likely to avoid ambiguous investments? (Trautmann
and Van De Kuilen (2015))
This paper attempts to partially ll this gap. We explore the relation
between ambiguity aversion and portfolio choices using a unique data set
that matches administrative panel data on portfolio choices with survey
data on preferences over ambiguity.
We have obtained portfolio data from a large nancial institution in
France. We focus on a popular investment product among French house-
holds dubbed assurance vie. In this product, households decide their portfo-
lio weight on relatively safe assets (essentially bundles of bonds, called euro
funds) vs. relatively risky assets (essentially mutual funds, called uc funds)
as well as some features of risky assets (such as their exposure to the do-
mestic vs. international stock markets). Households can freely change their
portfolios over time. Our data record the clientsportfolio of these contracts
at a monthly frequency for about nine years. Moreover, for each portfolio,
we can construct the corresponding returns.
Clients were also asked to answer a survey that we have designed and that
serves two main purposes. First, while portfolio data only concern house-
holdsactivities within the company, in the survey we gather a more com-
1See, e.g., Etner, Jeleva and Tallon (2012), Machina and Siniscalchi (2014), Gilboa and
Marinacci (2013) for surveys of the various models, and Hey (2014) or Trautmann and Van
De Kuilen (2015) for surveys of the experimental literature. Closely related experimental
evidence is provided in Ahn, Choi, Gale and Kariv (2014), who study how ambiguity
aversion a¤ects portfolio choices, and in Bossaerts, Ghirardato, Guarnaschelli and Zame
(2010), who focus on its e¤ects on asset prices.
2Epstein and Schneider (2010) and Guidolin and Rinaldi (2013) provide recent insight-
ful reviews on ambiguity and nancial choices. Macro-nance applications include Uppal
and Wang (2003), Ju and Miao (2012), Collard, Mukerji, Sheppard and Tallon (2012).
On the role of ambiguity in nancial crises, see e.g. Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2008)
and Caballero and Simsek (2013).
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plete picture of householdsportfolios as well as various socio-demographic
data. Second, we elicit a number of behavioral traits, and in particular
households attitudes towards ambiguity. Following standard procedures,
we build our main measure of ambiguity aversion by asking subjects to
choose between lotteries with known vs. unknown probability distributions
over the nal payo¤s.
Guided by some fundamental insights developed in the theoretical lit-
erature of portfolio choices under ambiguity, we focus on three dimensions
of household portfolios. We rst look at how the composition of portfo-
lios varies with ambiguity aversion. Is it the case that ambiguity aversion
leads to a form of under-diversication, as predicted for example in Uppal
and Wang (2003) and Hara and Honda (2016)? In particular, do ambiguity
averse investors display a preference for home stocks, as in Boyle, Garlappi,
Uppal and Wang (2012)?
Second, we ask whether ambiguity averse households display distinct
portfolio returns. Are their returns systematically lower, so that in the long
run these investors are bound to be wiped out of the market, as in Condie
(2008)? At the same time, in relation to under-diversication, are their
returns more volatile?
Third, we analyze the relation between ambiguity aversion and portfolio
dynamics. In particular, as suggested by recent models on portfolio inertia
(Garlappi, Uppal and Wang (2007), Illeditsch (2011)), is it the case that
ambiguity averse households keep their portfolio weights more stable over
time?
In terms of portfolio composition, we nd that ambiguity averse investors
are more exposed to risk, as dened both in terms of the volatility of returns
and in terms of beta relative to the French stock market. This extra expo-
sure to risk could come, as suggested for instance by Klibano¤, Marinacci
and Mukerji (2005), from a desire to shy away from ambiguity. To pursue
this line, we distinguish portfolios according to their relative exposure to
the French and the world markets. We build a measure of di¤erential expo-
sure based on the di¤erence between a "domestic" beta -which employs as
benchmark the French stock market index CAC40- and an "international"
beta -which instead uses as benchmark the MSCI World Index. We show
that ambiguity averse investors are relatively more exposed to the French
than to the international stock market. Ambiguity aversion is thus a good
candidate to explain home bias in equity markets.
We also study the extent to which portfolio returns are explained by
simple asset pricing models, and in particular by a domestic CAPM and
by the Fama-French ve-factor model. In both specications, we nd that
the higher ambiguity aversion, the lower is the explanatory power of mar-
ket factors. Ambiguity averse investors appear to bear more idiosyncratic
volatility, suggesting a possible under-diversication in their portfolios.
3
We then look at portfolio returns. We nd that, in our sample, ambigu-
ity averse investors experience higher returns, even controlling for standard
measures of risk. At the same time, however, their returns are more sensitive
to market trends. Our estimates show that the larger ambiguity aversion,
the higher are returns in good times and the lower are returns in bad times.
A similar picture emerges as we explore the di¤erential exposure of am-
biguity averse investors to Fama-French factors. These investors experience
relatively higher returns when returns of the market portfolio are high, even
more so when we construct market returns based only on the French stock
market. Moreover, we show that ambiguity averse investors are more ex-
posed to the Fama-French investment factor; that is, their portfolios load
more on rms with "conservative" as opposed to "aggressive" investment
strategies.
Finally, we investigate the dynamics of household portfolios. In partic-
ular, we focus on how householdsrisky share, as measured by the share of
uc funds in their portfolios, evolves over time. Following the methodology
developed in Calvet, Campbell and Sodini (2009), we distinguish changes
in risk exposure which are driven by di¤erential returns of risky vs. riskless
assets from those which result from an active choice of the household. We
show that ambiguity averse investors tend to rebalance their portfolio more
actively; that is, their risky share tends to remain closer to the target share.
Furthermore, we show that ambiguity averse investors adopt a contrarian
strategy, moving wealth from funds which have experienced relatively higher
returns to those who had relatively lower returns. This rebalancing strategy
aims at keeping the risky share relatively constant over time, which is in
line with the above mentioned models of ambiguity aversion and portfolio
inertia.
In the next sections we discuss each of these ndings and we highlight in
more details their relation with the existing theoretical literature. From a
somewhat broader perspective, we believe these insights contribute to a bet-
ter understanding of the empirical content of ambiguity preferences. While
from a conceptual viewpoint the importance of ambiguity has been recog-
nized at least since Knight (1921), its empirical content is still unclear. In
his Nobel lecture, Hansen (2014) calls for further research aimed at assessing
whether ambiguity, in addition to risk, is empirically relevant for the study
of asset pricing. Our results are strongly suggestive that ambiguity aversion
is an important determinant of observed nancial outcomes. We believe
they should serve as motivation for further work aimed at distinguishing
more clearly risk from ambiguity both in investorsperceptions and in their
nancial behavior.
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Related Literature
To our knowledge, this study is the rst to provide evidence on the e¤ect of
ambiguity aversion on nancial outcomes observed in administrative data.
As such, it relates, from an empirical angle, to the mostly theoretical liter-
ature that has studied the implications of ambiguity aversion for portfolio
choices and nancial markets.3
We also contribute to the household nance literature by looking at the
determinants of householdsnancial decisions. The literature is growing
rapidly and we refer to Campbell (2006) and Guiso and Sodini (2013) for
recent surveys. Compared to this literature, our main novelty is in matching
survey and administrative data. While as pointed out our data do not pro-
vide a detailed picture of the entire householdsportfolios (as for example in
Calvet, Campbell and Sodini (2007) and Calvet et al. (2009)), they o¤er the
opportunity to study the relation between behavioral traits and the choices
taken within the company. The latter allows us to address quantitative
issues that purely survey data usually cannot address.
We know of only a few studies combining survey and administrative data.
Dorn and Huberman (2005) focus on the relation between risk aversion,
(perceived) nancial sophistication and portfolio choices; Alvarez, Guiso and
Lippi (2012) analyze the frequency with which investors observe and trade
their portfolio; Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2017) and Ho¤mann, Post and
Pennings (2013) study how risk aversion has changed following the nancial
crisis; Bauer and Smeets (2015) and Riedl and Smeets (2014) investigate
how social preferences a¤ect socially responsible investments. None of these
studies focuses on ambiguity preferences as we do.
Most closely related to our study, Dimmock, Kouwenberg and Wakker
(2016) and Dimmock, Kouwenberg, Mitchell and Peijnenburg (2016) exploit
large representative surveys in which subjects are asked about their prefer-
ences over ambiguity as well as about their portfolio holdings. We share with
these authors a similar methodology to elicit ambiguity aversion (although
our subjects receive no monetary reward in relation to their choices) but
the nature of our data, and so the questions we address, are quite di¤erent.
Their data are based on surveys, and they are larger in size and in scope.
This allows them to investigate issues of stock market participation which
we cannot address. Our data provide more details on the investment prod-
uct at hand as well as a panel structure, and this allows us to investigate
questions on portfolio dynamics and returns which cannot be addressed with
their data.
Dimmock, Kouwenberg, Mitchell and Peijnenburg (2016) also point at
3Recent developments include Gollier (2011) on the comparative statics of ambiguity
aversion in portfolio choices; Maccheroni, Marinacci and Ru¢ no (2013) on mean-variance
preferences; Hara and Honda (2016) on CARA smooth ambiguity preferences; Epstein
and Ji (2013) and Lin and Riedel (2014) on dynamic portfolio choices.
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a positive relation between ambiguity aversion and lack of portfolio diver-
sication. We complement their ndings by documenting forms of under-
diversication starting from information about realized portfolio returns as
opposed to stock holding. This allows to highlight how under-diversication
a¤ects the riskiness of household portfolios, and to provide support for the
idea that ambiguity averse investors tend to bear more risk so as to avoid
ambiguity, consistently with di¤erent models in the literature (see Section 4
for details).
2 Data
We exploit three sources of data. First, we have obtained data on portfolio
choices from a large French nancial institution. These data describe clients
holdings of assurance vie contracts. These are investment products widely
used in France; they are the most common way through which households
invest in the stock market.4 A typical assurance vie contract establishes the
types of funds in which the household wishes to invest and the amount of
wealth allocated to each fund.
A rst key distinction is between euro funds and uc funds. The rst type
of assets, which are called euro funds, are basically bundles of bonds. The
capital invested in these funds is guaranteed by the company. The second
type of funds are called uc funds, and they are essentially bundles of stocks.
It is made clear to investors that uc funds tend to provide larger expected
returns and larger risk. Investors do not observe the exact composition of
these funds (neither do we), but they receive some information about the
intended risk prole of these funds (e.g. conservative vs. aggressive) as well
as an indication of their exposure to di¤erent markets. A particularly salient
feature is whether funds invest in domestic, emerging, or world markets.
Over time, clients are free to change the composition of their portfolios,
make new investment and withdraw money as they wish.5 Investors may opt
for automatic rebalancing of their portfolio according to some pre-specied
rule. In our sample, less than 10% of investors have chosen this option (see
the Online Appendix for further details).
Our portfolio data records at a monthly frequency the value and compo-
sition of these contracts for 511 clients from September 2002 to April 2011.
These data are combined with the responses to a survey we have designed
4According to the French National Institute for Statistics, 41% of French households
held at least one of these contracts in 2010. This makes it the most widespread nancial
product after Livret A, a saving account whose returns are set by the state. See INSEE
Premiere n. 1361 - July 2011 (http://www.insee.fr/fr/¤c/ipweb/ip1361/ip1361.pdf).
5A specic feature of the product is that there is some incentive not to liquidate the
contract before some time (8 years in our sample period) so as to take advantage of reduced
taxes on capital gains. We show in the Online Appendix that this feature is immaterial
for our results.
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and which was administered by a professional survey company at the end of
2010:6
The nancial institution has provided to the survey company a sample
of clients who had an account open at the end of 2010. The survey was then
implemented in order to obtain a representative sample of French households
in terms of family status, employment status, sector of employment, revenues
(these characteristics follow o¢ cial classications of the National Institute
for Statistics).7 All clients in our sample held some assurance vie contract
in the nancial company at the time when the survey was conducted, but
not necessarily throughout the entire sample period.8
These contracts can represent a sizeable fraction of householdsnan-
cial wealth. In our sample, the average value of a portfolio is 32; 700 euros,
the maximum is 590; 000 euros. The median total wealth in our sample
is between 225 and 300 thousand euros and the median nancial wealth is
between 16 and 50 thousands euros. These gures are in line with those ob-
tained for the general French population (see Arrondel, Borgy and Savignac
(2012)).9
The survey serves two main purposes: rst, we have gathered information
about demographic characteristics, wealth and portfolio holdings outside the
company. In this way we can control for a richer set of clientscharacteristics
than those recorded by the company. Moreover, this allows to gauge whether
the behaviors we observe within the company are informative for clients
behaviors in their overall portfolio (see the Online Appendix for details).
A second purpose of the survey is to get an idea of clientsbehavioral
characteristics, and in particular of their preferences over ambiguity. In the
next section, we describe how we have elicited these preferences.10
Finally, we collected data on portfolio returns. We have obtained from
Thomson Reuters Datastream the returns experienced in a given month by
6 It was made clear to the subjects that they were contacted as part of a scientic
project on risk, while the insurance company was never mentioned during the interview.
Clients completed the survey over the internet while on line with the surveyor.
7The insurance company gave to the survey company a sample of approximately 30,000
clients. This sample was stratied according to geographic regions (Ile De France, North-
East, West, South-East, South-West) and the survey was conducted so as to meet pre-
specied quotas of respondents in terms of the above-mentioned socio-demographic char-
acteristics.
8We did not impose any minimal holding period to be included in the sample. We
discuss in the Online Appendix a series of robustness checks to address the possibility of
survivorship bias in this sample.
9For o¢ cial and comprehensive data, see the 2010 Household
Wealth Survey from the French National Institute for Statistics
(http://www.insee.fr/en/methodes/default.asp?page=sources/ope-enquete-
patrimoine.htm).
10Our measure of ambiguity aversion is taken just at one point in time, towards the
end of the sample period. In the Online Appendix, we show that the e¤ects of ambiguity
aversion would be similar if we were to restrict our analysis to the beginning of the sample
period. This suggests that our measure of ambiguity aversion has a persistent component.
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each fund and, based on those, we can build the corresponding returns of
each contract.
3 Ambiguity Preferences
We elicit preferences over ambiguity in a classical way. We ask respondents
to choose between a risky lottery and an ambiguous lottery. For the former
lottery, we provide an exact probability distribution over the nal payo¤s;
for the latter, we provide no information about the probabilities associated
to the nal payo¤s. Depending on their answer, we sequentially provide
alternative lotteries in which the risky lottery is made relatively more or
less attractive. We describe these lotteries in details in the Appendix.
This approach is in line with the results in Dimmock, Kouwenberg and
Wakker (2016), who formally show that ambiguity attitudes can be entirely
described by matching probabilities. Di¤erently from Dimmock, Kouwen-
berg and Wakker (2016), we only had space for a few questions and thus
we could only construct a coarser measure of ambiguity attitudes. More-
over, our lotteries were hypothetical, and this comes with the usual pros
and cons.11 As we detail below, however, we have found a remarkable con-
sistency across various measures and elicitation methods, which suggests we
are capturing a systematic component of investorspreferences.
We build the index Ambig Aversion which takes value 1 to 4 from the
least to the most ambiguity averse client. This variable will serve as our
main measure of ambiguity preferences.12 In the Appendix, we also provide
a description of the other variables used in the subsequent analysis. In Table
1, we report some descriptive statistics.
We rst explore the correlation between Ambig Aversion and a set of
demographic characteristics: age, gender, education, marital status, income,
wealth (we refer to Table 1 in the Online Appendix for the corresponding
results). Ambig Aversion appears negatively related to age and positively
related to income. Other variables are not signicantly correlated.13 We
also observe that our index is positively related to a qualitative measure
of ambiguity aversion, which is based on how much the subject declares
disliking uncertainty.
We then analyze the relation between ambiguity aversion and other be-
havioral traits. We start with risk aversion. Existing results on the rela-
11See Dimmock, Kouwenberg and Wakker (2016) and Gneezy, Imas and List (2015) for
a discussion.
12 In the Online Appendix, we consider several alternative measures such as dummy
variables coding subjects as ambiguity averse as well as accounting for preferences in the
loss domain.
13Butler, Guiso and Jappelli (2014) nd a strong positive relation between ambiguity
aversion and wealth. In our data, the relation is positive but not precise (t-stat 1.63). It
would be interesting for future studies to explore this relation more systematically.
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tion between risk and ambiguity preferences are not conclusive: Dimmock,
Kouwenberg and Wakker (2016) report a negative relation while Butler et al.
(2014) a positive relation between the two (see Wakker (2016) for an exhaus-
tive list of references). We build a 1 to 4 index Risk Aversion (1 being the
least and 4 the most risk averse client) by asking respondents to compare a
sure outcome to a series of risky lottery. We observe no signicant relation
between risk and ambiguity aversion in our sample.
The literature suggests that ambiguity preferences may also relate to
other characteristics such as sophistication (Halevy (2007); Chew, Ratch-
ford and Sagi (2017)), lack of condence about the context (Heath and
Tversky (1991); Fox and Tversky (1995)), or present biased preferences
(Halevy (2008); Cohen, Tallon and Vergnaud (2011)). Our survey allows to
build some measures related to these traits, as we detail in the Appendix.
We observe no signicant relation between Ambig Aversion and our mea-
sures of sophistication, condence, and time preference. This suggests that,
in our subsequent analysis, these behavioral traits are unlikely to interfere
with the estimated e¤ects of ambiguity aversion.14
4 Portfolio Composition
In this section, we investigate how ambiguity aversion a¤ects the composi-
tion of household portfolios. We rst revisit some theoretical insights on this
relation. We then provide evidence that ambiguity averse decision makers
are more exposed to domestic risk, in line with the theory that sees ambi-
guity aversion as a possible explanation for the home bias puzzle, and that
this extra exposure is associated to more volatile portfolios.
4.1 Theoretical Background
A general idea from the theoretical literature is that ambiguity aversion
leads to under-diversied portfolio and, in particular, could be an ingredient
helping understand the home bias puzzle. This is a fairly robust prediction
which has been established in various settings and with di¤erent modeling
of ambiguity preferences. In Uppal and Wang (2003), investors consider
the possibility that their model of asset returns is misspecied, in line with
the approach to robustness developed in Hansen and Sargent (2001). This
concern leads to portfolios which are signicantly under-diversied relative
to the standard mean-variance portfolio. The reason is that robustness
considerations induce investors to put less weight on expected returns and
to focus on stocks (or benchmarks) which are perceived as less risky.
14We refer to the Online Appendix for a series of robustness checks on the interaction
between ambiguity aversion and other behavioral traits and to Bianchi (2017) for a study
of the e¤ects of nancial literacy in this setting.
9
Building on models with maxmin preferences à la Gilboa and Schmeidler
(1989), Garlappi et al. (2007) and Boyle et al. (2012) compare the optimal
portfolio of an ambiguity averse decision maker to that of a more traditional
Markowitz investor. They show that ambiguity aversion leads to portfolios
that are overly exposed to more familiar stocks, which are perceived as less
ambiguous. In Boyle et al. (2012), domestic stocks are perceived as more
familiar, which suggests that ambiguity aversion can provide an explanation
to the home bias puzzle. In a general equilibrium framework, Epstein and
Miao (2003) show that introducing maxmin investors helps to resolve the
puzzles concerning home bias in consumption and equity.
Finally, forms of under-diversication occur in the smooth approach to
ambiguity aversion proposed by Klibano¤ et al. (2005). In this class of
models too, the desire to avoid ambiguity may induce investors to take
more risk. Klibano¤ et al. (2005) provide an example in which the ratio
of the holding of the ambiguous asset on the risky asset decreases with
ambiguity aversion. Hara and Honda (2016) extend a classic CARA-Normal
setting so as to accommodate ambiguity and ambiguity aversion. They
show that in general the two funds theorem does not hold with ambiguity
aversion: the optimal portfolio of an ambiguity averse investor cannot be
simply expressed in terms of a safe asset and a mutual fund, and di¤erent
investors are likely to hold ambiguous assets in di¤erent proportions. The
reason is that, in the smooth ambiguity model, ambiguity aversion works as if
the investor was distorting the information about the distribution of returns.
This implies that investors with di¤erent levels of ambiguity aversion tend
to hold di¤erent mutual funds in their portfolios.
Despite the di¤erent formalizations of ambiguity preferences, these mod-
els share similar predictions in terms of under-diversication. In particular,
they predict that ambiguity averse investors tend to hold portfolios which
are overly exposed to assets perceived as less ambiguous.
4.2 Results
In this section, we rst provide some suggestive evidence on the relation be-
tween ambiguity aversion and exposure to risk. This serves as a motivation
to study in more details the composition of household portfolio so as to shed
light on the relation between ambiguity aversion and under-diversication.
First, we consider householdsexposure to the domestic relative to the in-
ternational market. Then, we estimate the level of idiosyncratic volatility
borne by each client through standard market factors models.
In order to have a rst pass on the relation between ambiguity aversion
and exposure to risk, we start with regressions of the following form:
yi;t = + AmbigAversi +X
0
i + t + "i;t; (1)
10
where yi;t is a given measure of risk of individual i0s portfolio at time t, X
0
i is
a set of controls and t are month-year xed-e¤ects. Unless otherwise noted,
our set of controls includes age, gender, education, marital status, income
and wealth.15 We also include Risk Aversion as control so as to make sure
that the estimated e¤ects of ambiguity aversion are not contaminated by
risk aversion. (Results are however una¤ected by this inclusion.)
Our coe¢ cient of interest is ; which describes the impact of ambigu-
ity preferences, as elicited in our survey, on individual is portfolio. As
the e¤ects may be correlated over time, we cluster standard errors at the
individual level.16
In column 1 of Table 2, the dependent variable is the value of uc funds
over the total value of the portfolio at time t. Ambiguity averse investors do
not display signicantly di¤erent portfolios in terms of composition between
euro funds and uc funds. A similar result is obtained by using as dependent
variable an indicator of whether the investor holds some uc funds in his
portfolio. Hence, we do not nd evidence that ambiguity aversion leads
to non-participation in the stock market through lower investment in uc
funds.17 Actually, our ndings suggest that investors do not view all uc
funds as ambiguous.
In columns 2-3, the dependent variable in (1) is the standard deviation
of the returns in the previous 12 months (in percentage points). We see that
ambiguity averse investors hold more volatile portfolios. A unit increase in
Ambiguity Aversion is associated to about 0:04 larger volatility of returns,
relative to an average volatility of 0:48. In columns 4-5, the dependent vari-
able is Beta(F ), constructed by regressing portfolio returns in the previous
12 months on the French stock market index CAC40. A unit increase in
Ambiguity Aversion is associated to about 0:01 larger beta, relative to an
average of 0:09.18
The previous results show that more ambiguity averse investors tend to
hold portfolios whose returns are more risky, although they do not signif-
icantly hold a larger share of uc funds. Following the theoretical insights
presented above, we explore whether the extra exposure to risk could be
15We asked subjects to report their level of education, age, income and wealth within
pre-specied intervals. In our regressions we include the corresponding ordinal variables.
Results would be unchanged if instead we used a series of dummies (see the Online Ap-
pendix).
16This makes it harder for us to nd statistically signicant results. As shown in the
Online Appendix, standard errors would be much smaller with alternative clustering.
17The non-participation hypothesis rests on the prediction of the maxmin expected
utility model that an ambiguity averse investor will not hold an ambiguous asset for a
range of prices. Note though that our data set is not ideal to study non-participation as
it only captures participation in the stock market through mutual funds.
18 In the Online Appendix, we show that one gets similar results by constructing these
variables in a forward-looking way based on the standard deviation and beta of the returns
in the next 12 months.
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driven by a desire to avoid ambiguity.
Taking the theoretical insights to the data is challenging. Ideally, it
would require to classify assets in terms of (perceived) ambiguity, for which
no general method is available. Some indirect ways have been proposed to
estimate ambiguity at the market level.19 At the micro level, the perception
may be subjective and hence di¢ cult to assess. Moreover, as mentioned,
in our data we have no direct information on which individual stocks are
included in a given uc fund.
We address the issue in two ways, taking advantage of the fact that we
observe realized returns in our data. First, we distinguish portfolios ac-
cording to their exposure to the French relative to the international market.
Second, similarly to Calvet et al. (2007), we employ standard market fac-
tors models in order to estimate the level of idiosyncratic volatility borne
by each client. In both cases, the premise is that, while reducing expo-
sure to stocks perceived as more ambiguous, ambiguity aversion may lead
to portfolio under-diversication.
We start by considering the exposure to foreign stock markets. We com-
pute Beta(W ) by regressing portfolio returns in the previous 12 months on
the MSCI World Index. In column 1 of Table 3, we observe no signicant
relation between Beta(W ) and Ambig Aversion. Given the earlier evidence
of higher exposure to the French stock market, we are lead to investigate
whether ambiguity aversion is associated to a di¤erential exposure to the
domestic vs. foreign markets. If we follow conventional wisdom and the
above mentioned literature, a higher exposure to international markets is
tantamount to bearing higher ambiguity.
The measure we take is simply the di¤erence between Beta(F) and
Beta(W). In column 2, we indeed observe that the larger ambiguity aversion
the larger is the di¤erence Beta(F)-Beta(W). In column 3, we include the
sum of the two betas in order to control for scale e¤ects. The e¤ect of am-
biguity aversion is positive and signicant, suggesting that ambiguity averse
investors are more exposed to the French rather than to the international
stock market. The estimated coe¢ cient implies that a standard deviation
increase in ambiguity aversion increases the di¤erence Beta(F)-Beta(W) by
0:7%, relative to the average di¤erence of 2:3%.
This is direct evidence that ambiguity aversion is a plausible explanation
of the observed home bias in the stock market: portfolios of more ambiguity
averse investors are more exposed to domestic stocks than to foreign stocks
compared with less ambiguity averse investors.
In a similar vein, Dimmock, Kouwenberg, Mitchell and Peijnenburg
(2016) employ a survey question on whether the respondent holds foreign
19Antoniou, Harris and Zhang (2015) identify ambiguity with more widespread experts
forecasts. Jurado, Ludvigson and Ng (2015) assimilate ambiguity with the unpredictable
part of the times series studied.
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stocks and document a negative relation between foreign stock holding and
ambiguity aversion. Our results complement their ndings. First, we doc-
ument home bias starting from information about portfolio returns, as op-
posed to self-reported measures of stock holding, which allows to show the
consistency between the two approaches. Moreover, our results point at a
form of home bias in mutual fund (as opposed to direct stock) holdings,
which we nd particularly remarkable given that mutual funds are com-
monly perceived as instruments to obtain well diversied portfolios. Third,
as we show in Section 5, we can explore in further details the implications
of home bias for realized returns.
We further address the relation between portfolio composition and ambi-
guity preferences by investigating to what extent the returns of the portfolios
held by our investors are explained by standard market factors. We run the
following time-series regressions separately for each client:
ri;t = i + iCACt + "i;t; (2)
in which ri;t are the returns experienced by client i at time t, CACt are the
returns of the CAC40 index in percentage points. We then repeat a similar
exercise using instead the Fama-French 5 factors model. For each client, we
consider the following model:
ri;t = i + imktrft + sismbt + hihmlt + rirmwt + cicmat + i;t; (3)
in which the returns experienced by client i at time t are regressed on the
standard 5 Fama-French Global factors.20
For each regression in (2) and in (3), we use the sum of squared residuals
(rssi) as a measure of how much the returns of a given portfolio are explained
by its exposure to the market factors and so of how much idiosyncratic risk
the agent bears. We also consider the R-squared from these regressions,
which indicates the level of idiosyncratic risk relative to total risk. The
latter is measured by the variance of the returns, which as showed earlier,
tends to increase with ambiguity aversion.
We investigate the relation between idiosyncratic risk and ambiguity
preferences in the following regression:
rssi = a+ bAmbigAversi +X
0
ic+ "i;
20The factors are taken from Kenneth Frenchs webpage and are explained in Fama
and French (2015). Mktrf denotes the excess return of the market portfolio; smb denotes
Small Minus Big; hml denotes High Minus Low; rmw denotes Robust Minus Weak and
cma denotes Conservative Minus Aggressive. Our result are qualitatively unchanged when
including only some of these factors as well as when including other factors (such as
momentum). Similarly, results do not change by considering factors at the European level
(whenever available).
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in which rssi is the above constructed sum of squared residuals and X
0
i
includes our usual set of controls. In alternative specications, we use the
R-squared as dependent variable.
We report our results in Table 3. In column 4, we report a positive
relation between ambiguity aversion and rssi as derived in regressions (2).
The same relation is obtained when estimating the sum of squared residuals
from the richer model (3), as reported in column 5. Similarly, we observe
a negative relation between ambiguity aversion and the R-squared obtained
in regressions (3). These estimates show a robust pattern: the higher ambi-
guity aversion the lower is the ability of standard market factors to explain
portfolio returns. These results suggest that ambiguity averse investors bear
more idiosyncratic volatility, also pointing to under-diversication.
5 Portfolio Returns
We now turn to the relation between ambiguity preferences and the re-
turns which investors experience in their portfolio. The following regressions
should not be viewed as a test of a particular asset pricing model nor as an
assessment of the performance of our investors. This would require a well-
dened normative benchmark about which portfolio our investors should
hold, as a function of their characteristics and, in particular the ambigu-
ity they perceive. The theoretical literature however does not provide a
synthetic benchmark against which one should assess how ambiguity averse
investors perform.21 Moreover, as discussed above, we have no direct mea-
sure of the ambiguity perceived by investors.
Yet, we do observe the returns of their portfolio and can assess whether,
in our sample, more ambiguity averse agents earn higher or lower returns.
This type of analysis is new in the literature and it complements the results
presented in the previous section by showing their implications in terms
of portfolio returns. Furthermore, this analysis points out that it is not
necessarily the case that ambiguity averse investors experience lower returns,
an observation which is relevant for the theoretical literature on the long-
run impact of ambiguity aversion on asset prices. This literature typically
builds on the idea that ambiguity averse investors earn lower returns (as
expected utility agents with biased beliefs would) and then studies their
long-run survival based on market selection arguments (see e.g. Condie
(2008) and Guerdijkova and Sciubba (2015)). While di¤erent models may
have di¤erent predictions on how much investors would a¤ect asset prices
depending on their relative wealth in the economy, or on the speed of decline
of lower performing investors, our results question the view that ambiguity
averse investors must earn lower returns. Irrespective of the specic selection
21Hara and Honda (2016) show that any given portfolio can be optimal for certain levels
of ambiguity aversion and perceived ambiguity.
14
model at hand, these results suggest that the inuence of ambiguity averse
investors need not disappear, and this can be seen as a further motivation
to incorporate them in asset pricing models.
5.1 Results
We employ the same specication as in equation (1) and use as dependent
variable the monthly returns (in percentage points) experienced by investor
i at time t. As benchmark, the average monthly return in the overall sample
is 0:38%.
In columns 1 and 2 of Table 4, it appears that in our sample ambigu-
ity averse individuals experience higher raw returns. We then add various
measures of portfolio risk as controls. In column 3, we include the value
of uc funds over the total value of the portfolio; in column 4, the standard
deviation of the returns; in column 5, we control for the beta of the returns
relative to the French stock market. In column 6, we account for higher
moments in the return distribution by including the skewness of the return
and the coskewness relative to the French stock market.22 The estimated
impact of ambiguity aversion, however, does not change much. Overall, in-
vestors with an extra unit of ambiguity aversion experience about 0:012%
higher returns per month (that is, about 0:2% per year).
Given the results on portfolio composition documented in the previous
section, we then investigate whether these di¤erences in returns are het-
erogeneous with respect to market conditions. In Table 5, AvgRet is the
average returns (in %) across all portfolios at time t: Our interest is in the
interaction with ambiguity preferences. It appears that the higher ambigu-
ity aversion, the higher are returns in good times and the lower are returns
in bad times. In particular, when average market returns increase by 1%,
investors experience 0:14% higher returns for each extra unit of ambiguity
aversion. Conversely, ambiguity averse investors experience lower returns
when market returns are low.23 These results are consistent with the above
evidence that ambiguity averse investors take more risk, in particular in
terms of exposure to the French market. Overall, their returns are higher,
but at the same time they are more sensitive to market trends. As in the
model by Boyle et al. (2012), under-diversication leads to more volatile
returns.
We explore these patterns further by replacing AvgRet with the ve
Fama-French factors introduced in equation (3). We are interested in inves-
22We measure the skewness as E[(R   R)3=3R], where R and R are respectively
the mean and the standard deviation of the returns R in the previous 12 months. We
measure the coskewness as E[(R R)2(C C)=2RC ]; where C and C are respectively
the mean and the standard deviation of the French stock market index CAC40 C in the
previous 12 months.
23These interactions are not a¤ected when controlling for measures of riskiness of the
portfolio.
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tigating whether the returns experienced by investor i at time t depend on
the interaction between investor is attitude towards ambiguity and a given
factor ft. These interactions terms indicate whether more ambiguity averse
investors hold a di¤erent exposure to factor ft.
In columns 3-4, we observe that the larger ambiguity aversion, the larger
is the exposure to factor Mktrf, that is the excess return of the market
portfolio. Consistently with the previous evidence, a larger exposure to
Mktrf would predict higher returns in good times and lower returns in bad
times.
As we have shown that ambiguity averse investors tend to be more ex-
posed to the French stock market, we then replace Mktrf with CAC, which
measures the returns of the French CAC40 Index. In column 5, we observe
that ambiguity averse investors have a larger exposure to CAC. When we
include both Mktrf and CAC (column 6), we observe that the interaction
between ambiguity aversion and Mktrf is no longer signicant once the ex-
posure to CAC is accounted for. These results are in line with our previous
evidence that ambiguity averse investors are overly exposed to the domestic
vs. the international stock market.24
Columns 3-6 also show that ambiguity averse investors hold portfolios
which are more exposed to "conservative" relative to "aggressive" rms.
This may indicate that aggressive rms, which display higher rates of in-
vestment and growth, are perceived as more ambiguous than conservative
rms (see Fama and French (2015)). Under this assumption, our result is
in line with the experimental literature (such as Bossaerts et al. (2010) and
Kocher and Trautmann (2013)) showing that ambiguity averse investors are
less likely to invest in ambiguous assets. While these authors focus on the
implications for the value premium (which would correspond to the HML
factor in our regressions), we highlight the interaction with the CMA factor.
To our knowledge, this result is new in the literature and we view it as a
suggestive line for future research.
6 Portfolio Dynamics
We now turn to investigating whether, depending on their attitudes towards
ambiguity, investors display di¤erent portfolio dynamics. A distinctive fea-
ture of our database is its panel dimension: we observe clientsbehavior at a
monthly frequency for about 9 years. This allows us to explore how investors
adjust their portfolio over time, and so to relate to a recent literature on
portfolio dynamics under ambiguity aversion.
24Notice however that a larger exposure to CAC40 relative to MSCI does not automat-
ically lead to higher returns in our sample period. In this period, the average monthly
returns of CAC40 are equal to 0:5% while for MSCI they are equal to 0:7%. We further
discuss this point in the Online Appendix, where we show that ambiguity averse investors
had higher information ratios in our sample.
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6.1 Theoretical Background
Several recent models have shown that ambiguity aversion may lead to forms
of portfolio inertia in that households may wish to keep their risk exposure
constant over time even upon observing shocks, say, to the distribution of
expected returns. Portfolio inertia can have important consequences also
for the functioning of asset markets, as it impacts the amount of informa-
tion revealed in prices and ultimately their level and volatility (Condie and
Ganguli (2012)).
The simplest intuition behind portfolio inertia can be found in a model
by Epstein and Schneider (2010) in which any realization of an ambiguous
variable entails good news (say about the returns of an asset) and at the
same time bad news (say about the variance of these returns). As they show,
there exist some portfolio position at which such news o¤set each other and
so the agent is completely hedged against ambiguity. This leads to a form
of portfolio inertia since it takes a large shock to prices to induce ambiguity
averse investors to move away from that position.
The intuition has proven robust in various settings. Illeditsch (2011)
considers a more general portfolio choice problem in which agents receive
signals of ambiguous precision. He shows that ambiguity averse investors
would stick to some intermediate portfolio weights for a range of prices since
at these positions agentsutility becomes independent of the signal precision.
Similar results appear in Garlappi et al. (2007) and Ganguli, Condie and
Illeditsch (2012), who show that ambiguity averse investors tend to keep
their portfolio weights constant as they tend not to respond to news about
future returns.
Based on these models, we expect that ambiguity averse investors will be
more likely to hold to a given position and therefore rebalance their portfolio
to maintain this position over time (i.e. after observing the various returns,
that a¤ect the value of the di¤erent funds they hold in their portfolio).
Two important observations should be mentioned in relation to our next
analysis. First, in the above mentioned models, portfolio inertia occurs
even conditional on participation, at positions containing a positive share of
ambiguous assets. Second, portfolio inertia does not mean that ambiguity
averse investors rebalance their portfolio less frequently. On the contrary,
that may require continuous rebalancing so as to compensate the uctuations
induced by the market. If, say, realized returns of uc funds exceed those of
euro funds, the relative value of uc funds in the portfolio would mechanically
increase. If the investor wishes to keep her exposure to uc funds constant,
she needs to reallocate wealth from uc funds to euro funds.
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6.2 Results
For each investor, we analyze how the value of uc funds over the total value of
the portfolio evolves over time. The share of uc funds is only a rough measure
of exposure to uncertainty (indeed, we have argued that the composition
of uc funds may also matter). At the same time, this measure has the
advantage of being simple (it is arguably the most salient characteristic of
the portfolio) and of being the closest to the literature. The above mentioned
models focus mostly on the fraction of wealth invested in uncertain assets,
not on their composition. Our empirical analysis follows closely Calvet et al.
(2009), who look at the fraction of wealth invested in uncertain assets, which
they call risky share. We adopt the same terminology and, in the next
analysis, we refer to the share of uc funds simply as the risky share.
We start by analyzing the intensity of portfolio rebalancing; that is, how
much of the observed change in the risky share is driven by active rebalancing
as opposed to passive changes induced by past market trends. Denote with
Xi;t 1 the risky share for individual i at time t 1. If ri;t  rf is the realized
excess return of uc funds for individual i between t   1 and t; the passive
share is dened as
XPi;t =
(1 + ri;t)Xi;t 1
1 + rf + (ri;t   rf )Xi;t 1 : (4)
The change of the risky share from Xi;t 1 to Xi;t; can be decomposed as
follows:
Xi;t = X
P
i;t + X
A
i;t 
 
XPi;t  Xi;t 1

+
 
Xi;t  XPi;t

(5)
i.e., it is the sum of the passive change and the active change. We then
employ the structural model developed by Calvet et al. (2009) so as to
study the intensity of rebalancing by observing the evolution of XPi;t and
XAi;t: Calvet et al. (2009) assume that households di¤er in their speed
of adjustment between the passive risky share and an (unobservable) target
share, and show that the speed of adjustment can be conveniently estimated
under the following conditions. First, the log of the risky share xi;t is a
weighted average between the log of the passive share xPi;t and the log of the
(unobservable) target xi;t: Denoting as i the speed of adjustment towards
the target share, we have
xi;t = ix

i;t + (1  i)xPi;t + ui;t: (6)
Second, the speed of adjustment is a linear function of a set of observable
household characteristics wi;t; that is,
i = 0 + 
0
wi;t: (7)
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Third, the change in the log target share is a linear function of these char-
acteristics,
xi;t = 0;t + 
0
twi;t: (8)
An advantage of the log specication is that xi;t can be dened indepen-
dently of individual-specic time-invariant characteristics. Taking the rst
di¤erence of (6), and using i and x

i;t from (7) and (8), we obtain
xi;t = at + b0x
P
i;t + b
0
wi;tx
P
i;t + c
0
twi;t + w
0
i;tDtwi;t + ui;t; (9)
in which at = 00;t; b0 = 1  0; b =  ; ct = 0t + 0;t and Dt = 
0
t: In
(9), xi;t is the change in the log risky share and xPi;t is the change in the
log passive share where all the changes are expressed in yearly terms (that
is, relative to 12 months before). The vector wi;t may include demographic
characteristics as well as portfolio characteristics (returns, standard devia-
tion). The coe¢ cient b0 measures the fraction of total change in the risky
share which is driven by the passive change. The lower the speed of adjust-
ment, the closer b0 should be to 1: Our main interest is in exploring whether
the speed of adjustment varies systematically with ambiguity preferences,
which we include in the set of characteristics wi;t:
An important observation in Calvet et al. (2009) is that OLS estimates
of b0 and b in equation (9) may be negatively biased since xPi;t and ui;t
may be negatively correlated. From (6) and (9), we can observe that a
positive shock to ui;t 1, for example, would reduce ui;t and at the same
time increase xi;t 1; which in turn would increase xPi;t and so increase x
P
i;t:
An instrument for xPi;t is x
IV
i;t dened as the (log) passive change that
would be observed in case the household did not rebalance in period t 1.25
As expected, given partial rebalancing, xIVi;t is indeed highly correlated
with xPi;t. The key assumption for the validity of the instrument is that
the returns ri;t are uncorrelated with the error term.
We collect our results in Table 6. In column 1, the OLS estimate of 
equals 0:37; in column 2, the IV estimate is 0:43: The latter implies that on
average our investors rebalance about 57% of their passive change over 12
months. The magnitude is comparable to Calvet et al. (2009), who report
estimates around 50% for Swedish households.
In columns 3-5, we investigate whether these e¤ects vary with ambiguity
preferences. In column 3, we include no control; in column 4, we include our
standard set of controls and time dummies; in column 5, we replicate the
full model in (9) by adding portfolio characteristics (returns and standard
deviation in the past 12 months), interacting all terms with the passive
change (that corresponds to b
0
wi;tx
P
i;t) and including the squared terms of
all controls (that corresponds to w0i;tDtwi;t). These estimates reveal that the
25Formally, xIVi;t = x^
P   xPt 1 where x^P = ln( (1+ri;t)X
P
t 1
1+rf+(ri;t rf )XPt 1
):
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higher ambiguity aversion the lower is the impact of the passive change on
the total change.
In terms of magnitude, each extra unit of ambiguity aversion decreases
the e¤ect of the passive change by approximately 26%. According to the
estimates in column 4, with Ambiguity Aversion equal to 1, the passive
change contributes to the entire change in risk exposure over 12 months. If
Ambiguity Aversion is equal to 4, the passive change instead contributes to
about 20% of the total change.
These results indicate that ambiguity averse investors display a higher
speed of adjustment of their portfolios. As noticed, this may be driven by
the desire to keep their risk exposure constant over time, which would be in
line with the above mentioned theoretical predictions.
We then look at the direction of rebalancing, described by the sign of
the active change relative to the passive change. If active change and pas-
sive change have the same sign, for example, the investor is rebalancing his
portfolio in the same direction as past market trends: he is increasing his
exposure to assets which have performed relatively well in the past. We
estimate the following equation:
XAi;t = + AmbigAversi XPi;t + XPi;t + Z
0
i + t + "i;t: (10)
In equation (10), the coe¢ cient  estimates the impact of the passive change
XPi;t on the active change X
A
i;t.
26 If investor i wishes to keep its risk ex-
posure constant over time, he needs to compensate any passive change with
an active change of the same magnitude and opposite sign. The coe¢ cient 
should then be close to  1. Our coe¢ cients of interest is ; which measures
the di¤erential impact of investorspreferences over ambiguity. The vector
Z
0
i includes the variables Ambiguity Aversion as well our standard set of
controls; t are month-year xed-e¤ects; standard errors are clustered at
the individual level.
Results appear in Table 7. In column 1, the coe¢ cient  is  0:63; which
implies that on average households compensate about 63% of the passive
change in their risky share. This is consistent with the estimates of Table
4 (column 1), and with Calvet et al. (2009), who show that on average
households act as rebalancer. Further evidence along those lines is reported
in Guiso and Sodini (2013).
In columns 2-5, we observe that the coe¢ cient  is negative. Estimates
are rather stable as we add various controls (column 3), lagged risky share
as in Calvet et al. (2009) (column 4) and if we exclude portfolios with zero
passive change (column 5). According to these estimates, the larger ambi-
guity aversion the closer the estimated impact is to  1. Specically, for the
least ambiguity averse investors, a unit increase in the passive change leads
26We estimate the equation in levels. Estimates in logs give qualitatively similar results.
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to active change of  0:53. For the most ambiguity averse investors, a unit
increase in the passive change leads to an active change of  0:67. Put dif-
ferently, for the most ambiguity averse investors, the distance between the
risky share and the constant share is on average 1=3 of the passive change.
As in our sample the average passive change is  3:8%, that leads to a risky
share which is on average 1:3% lower than the constant share.
This evidence is consistent with the theoretical models mentioned above
in which ambiguity averse investors may be reluctant to change their expo-
sure to uncertainty over time. For this purpose, they need to rebalance their
portfolio actively and in a contrarian direction relative to market trends,
which is indeed what we observe.
7 Concluding Remarks
Our analysis has provided novel results relating ambiguity preferences to
the composition, the returns and the dynamics of household portfolios. We
have performed several robustness checks on these results, which we report
in details in the Online Appendix. First, we have showed that the e¤ects we
observe within the company do not vary systematically with the fraction of
wealth invested in the company, suggesting that they are representative of
clientsbehaviors in their overall portfolios. We have also checked that some
specic features of assurance vie contracts, like the possibility of delegated
portfolio management and scal advantages, do not a¤ect our results. On
ambiguity aversion, we have considered alternative measures (including pref-
erences in the loss domain) as well as their interaction with other behavioral
traits (such as sophistication, condence, and time preference). Finally, we
have discussed our treatment of standard errors and the possibility of sur-
vivorship bias in our sample. These tests have shown the robustness of our
main ndings along all these dimensions.
We view this study only as a rst step towards an understanding of the
empirical content of ambiguity preferences in relation to nancial choices.
Further research is needed to assess whether one particular decision model is
most relevant to describe investorspreferences over ambiguity. Our study
has identied channels through which ambiguity aversion (measured inde-
pendently of a specic decision model) a¤ects portfolio behaviors. While
this gives some insights on which models are consistent with these e¤ects,
it does not provide a direct test of these models.27 Getting richer invest-
ment data and ner measures of ambiguity aversion is an obvious direction
of improvement, for which a close collaboration with nancial institutions
is required.
Our results can also be helpful to guide recommendations regarding the
27 In fact, using a much more structured approach, Ahn et al. (2014) nd that not one
single model can explain their experimental portfolio data.
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way individuals tolerance for uncertainty should be assessed by nancial
institutions. At the European level for instance, regulation requires nan-
cial institutions to gather information about their clients objectives and
preferences before selling them nancial products. What our results sug-
gest is that ambiguity aversion should be carefully taken into account when
advising individual investors.
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8 Appendix
8.1 Description of variables
Ambig Aversion
The variable is based on the following questions: "You have two options:
(a) win 1000 euros with a completely unknown probability vs. (b) win 1000
euros with 50% chance and zero otherwise. Which one would you choose?"
If (a) is chosen, we propose (c) win 1000 euros with a completely unknown
probability vs. (d) win 1000 euros with 60% chance and zero otherwise. If
(b) is chosen, we propose (e) win 1000 euros with a completely unknown
probability vs. (f) win 1000 euros with 40% chance and zero otherwise. We
build the variable Ambig Aversion which takes values 1 if (a) and (c) are
chosen, 2 if (a) and (d) are chosen, 3 if (b) and (e) are chosen, and 4 if (b)
and (f) are chosen.
Education
The variable takes value 1 if no formal education is reported, 2 refers to
vocational training, 3 refers to baccalaureat, 4 refers to a 2-years post bac
diploma, 5 refers to a 3-years post bac diploma, 6 refers to a 4-years post
bac diploma, 7 refers to a 5-years post bac diploma or above.
Age
The variable takes value 1 if the respondent is less than 30 years old, 2
refers to between 30 and 44 years old, 3 refers to between 45 and 64 years
old, 4 refers to 65 years or older.
Income
Monthly net revenues of the household (in euros). A value of 1 corre-
sponds to less than 1000, 2 indicates between 1000 and 1499, 3 indicates
between 1500 and 1999, 4 indicates between 2000 and 2999, 5 indicates be-
tween 3000 and 4999, 6 indicates 5000 and 6999, 7 indicates between 7000
and 9999, 8 indicates over 10000.
Wealth
Total wealth of the household (in euros). A value of 1 corresponds to less
than 8000, 2 indicates between 8000 and 14999, 3 indicates between 15000
and 39999, 4 indicates between 40000 and 79999, 5 indicates between 80000
and 149999, 6 indicates 150000 and 224999, 7 indicates between 225000 and
299999, 8 indicates between 300000 and 449999, 9 indicates between 450000
and 749999, 10 indicates between 750000 and 999999, 11 indicates over 1
million.
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Dislike Uncertainty
The variable is based on the following question: "I dont mind facing
uncertainty". 1 corresponds to "I completely agree." 2 corresponds to "I
partly agree." 3 corresponds to "I do not agree nor disagree." 4 corresponds
to "I quite disagree." 5 corresponds to "I fully disagree."
Risk Aversion
The variable is based on the following questions: "You have two options:
(a) win 400 euros for sure vs. (b) win 1000 euros with 50% chance and zero
otherwise. Which one would you choose?" In case (a) is chosen, we then
o¤er the choice between (c) win 300 euros for sure vs. (d) win 1000 euros
with 50% chance and zero otherwise. In case (b) is chosen, we instead o¤er
the choice between (e) win 500 euros for sure vs. (f) win 1000 euros with
50% chance and zero otherwise. We build the variable Risk Aversion which
takes values 4 if (a) and (c) are chosen, 3 if (a) and (d) are chosen, 2 if (b)
and (e) are chosen, and 1 if (b) and (f) are chosen.
Compute Interest
"Suppose that you have 1000 e in a saving account which o¤ers a return
of 2% per year. After ve years, assuming that you have not touched your
initial deposit, how much would you own? a) Less than 1100e; b) Exactly
1100e; c) More than 1100e; d) I dont know." The variable Compute In-
terest is a dummy equal to 1 if the subject answered More than 1100 e, and
equal to zero otherwise.
Condent
The variable is a 1-7 index based on "Do you think you can master nan-
cial risk?" 1 corresponds to "not at all" and 7 corresponds to "completely."
Hyperbolic
"You can choose between 1) 1000 euros now; 2) 1020 euros in a month.
Which one would you choose?" and "You can choose between 1) 1000 euros
in 12 months; 2) 1020 euros in 13 months. Which one would you choose?"
The variable Hyperbolic is a dummy equal to 1 if 1) was chosen in the rst
question and 2) was chosen in the second question, and to zero otherwise.
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8.2 Tables
Table 1: Summary Statistics
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Ambig Aversion 511 3.086 1.134 1 4
Education 501 4.421 1.886 1 7
Married 511 0.763 0.426 0 1
Age 511 2.613 0.753 1 4
Female 511 0.472 0.500 0 1
Income 494 4.532 1.553 1 8
Wealth 469 6.885 2.467 1 11
Dislike Uncertainty 510 3.318 1.081 1 5
Risk Aversion 511 3.090 1.198 1 4
Compute Interest 511 0.534 0.499 0 1
Condence 511 3.603 1.438 1 7
Hyperbolic 511 0.196 0.397 0 1
UC Share 39892 0.231 0.286 0 1
Std Dev (in %) 38894 0.478 0.697 0 8.240
Beta (F) 40083 0.097 0.174 -0.126 1.180
Beta (W) 39892 0.074 0.127 -0.268 1.091
Beta(F)-Beta(W) 39892 0.023 0.153 -0.996 1.057
Monthly Returns (in %) 40083 0.385 0.940 -8.616 7.391
Skewness 37937 -0.079 1.230 -3.606 3.606
Coskewness 37435 -0.073 0.473 -4.096 3.916
Change Risky Share 16455 -0.011 0.547 -7.752 6.709
Change Pass Share 13957 -0.104 0.521 -7.357 6.762
Change Pass Share (IV) 13927 -0.106 0.486 -6.051 5.225
Active Change 33217 0.052 0.171 -1 0.999
Passive Change 30847 -0.038 0.142 -0.999 1
Residuals(1) 511 0.005 0.008 0 0.059
Residuals(5) 511 0.005 0.009 0 0.077
R-squared 511 0.204 0.152 0.006 0.805
AvgRet 104 0.385 0.367 -0.587 1.24
Mktrf 104 0.579 4.599 -17.23 10.19
SMB 104 0.483 2.481 -4.76 6.73
HML 104 0.164 2.562 -9.87 7.57
RMW 104 0.078 2.082 -8.86 5.69
CMA 104 0.155 1.510 -3.16 5.02
CAC 104 0.337 5.365 -17.49 13.41
Note: The table reports summary statistics for all variables used in the
regressions. A denition of these variables can be found in the text and
in Section 8.1.
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Table 2: Risk Exposure
Dep Variable UC Share Std Dev Beta(F)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Ambig Aversion 0.007 0.048 0.043 0.013 0.010
(0.011) (0.020)** (0.019)** (0.005)** (0.005)**
Controls Yes No Yes No Yes
Time Dummies Yes No Yes No Yes
Number of Obs 35578 38894 34672 40083 35759
Number of Clusters 457 510 457 510 457
R-squared 0.074 0.006 0.122 0.008 0.128
Note: This table reports the results of OLS regressions. In column 1, the de-
pendent variable is the value of uc funds over the total value of the portfolio. In
columns 3-4, the dependent variable is the standard deviation of the returns in the
previous 12 months. In columns 5-6, the dependent variable Beta(F) is obtained
by regressing the returns in the previous 12 months on the French stock mar-
ket index CAC40. Controls include risk aversion, age, gender, education, marital
status, income and wealth. Robust standard errors, clustered at the individual
level, are in brackets. ,  and  denotes signicance at 10%, 5% and 1% level,
respectively.
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Table 3: Under-Diversication
Dep Variable Beta(W) Beta(F)-Beta(W) Residuals(1) Residuals(5) R-squared
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ambig Aversion 0.001 0.009 0.007 0.001 0.001 -0.013
(0.003) (0.003)*** (0.002)*** (0.0001)*** (0.0003)*** (0.006)**
Beta(F)+Beta(W) 0.202
(0.024)***
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes No No No
Number of Obs 35578 35578 35578 452 452 451
Number of Clusters 457 457 457 452 452 451
R-squared 0.106 0.061 0.165 0.081 0.073 0.088
Note: This table reports the results of OLS regressions. In column 1, the dependent variable Beta(W)
is obtained by regressing the returns in the previous 12 months on the world stock market index
MSCI. In columns 2-3, the dependent is the di¤erence between Beta(F) and Beta(W). In column
3, Beta(F)+Beta(W) is the sum of Beta(F) and Beta(W). In column 4, the dependent variable is
the sum of squared residuals in the regression of each clients returns on the returns in the domestic
stock market CAC40 (see equation (2)). In column 5, the dependent variable is the sum of squared
residuals in the regression of each clients returns on Fama-French market factors (see equation (3)).
In column 6, the dependent variable is the R-squared of the same regression. Controls include risk
aversion, age, gender, education, marital status, income and wealth. Robust standard errors, clustered
at the individual level, are in brackets. ,  and  denotes signicance at 10%, 5% and 1% level,
respectively.
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Table 4: Portfolio Returns
Dep Variable Monthly Returns (in %)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ambig Aversion 0.016 0.014 0.014 0.013 0.012 0.012
(0.006)*** (0.006)** (0.006)** (0.006)** (0.006)** (0.006)**
UC Share 0.056
(0.031)*
Std Dev 0.035 0.08
(0.014)** (0.039)**
Beta(France) 0.056 -0.189
(0.042) (0.148)
Skewness 0.037
(0.014)***
Coskewness 0.038
(0.021)*
Controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time Dummies No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Obs 37642 33561 33391 32549 33561 31265
Number of Clusters 510 457 456 456 457 456
R-squared 0.001 0.218 0.220 0.220 0.218 0.232
Note: This table reports the results of OLS regressions. The dependent variable is the monthly
returns of the portfolio in percentage points. UC Share is the value of the uc funds over the
total value of the portfolio. Std Dev and Skewness are respectively the standard deviation
and the skewness of the returns in the previous 12 months. Beta(F) is obtained by regressing
the returns in the previous 12 months on the French stock market index CAC40. Coskewness
measures the coskewness between the returns and the French stock market index CAC40 in
the previous 12 months. Controls include risk aversion, age, gender, education, marital status,
income and wealth. Robust standard errors, clustered at the individual level, are in brackets.
,  and  denotes signicance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 5: Market Factors
Dep Variable Monthly Returns (in %)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ambig Aversion -0.037 -0.041 0.011 0.009 0.01 0.01
(0.022)* (0.023)* (0.006)* (0.006) (0.006)* (0.006)
AvgRet*Ambig 0.137 0.144
(0.058)** (0.058)**
Mktrf*Ambig 0.007 0.007 0.001
(0.004)* (0.004)* (0.002)
SMB*Ambig -0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
HML*Ambig 0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
RMW*Ambig 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.005
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002)* (0.003)*
CMA*Ambig 0.005 0.006 0.006 0.006
(0.003)* (0.003)** (0.002)** (0.003)**
CAC*Ambig 0.007 0.006
(0.347)** (0.299)**
Controls No Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Obs 37642 33561 37642 33561 33561 33561
Number of Clusters 510 457 510 457 457 457
R-squared 0.213 0.223 0.21 0.22 0.22 0.22
Note: This table reports the results of OLS regressions. The dependent variable is the
monthly returns of the portfolio in percentage points. AvgRet is the average returns across
all portfolios at time t; Mktrf, SMB, HML, RMW and CMA are the Fama-French factors;
CAC is the average returns of the CAC40. *Ambig denotes the interaction with Ambig
Aversion. Controls include risk aversion, age, gender, education, marital status, income and
wealth. Robust standard errors, clustered at the individual level, are in brackets. ,  and
 denotes signicance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 6: Portfolio Dynamics
Dep Variable Total Change log Risky Share
OLS IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Ambig Av * Change Pass Share -0.296 -0.261 -0.266
(0.106)*** (0.061)*** (0.085)***
Change Pass Share 0.365 0.429 1.388 1.300 2.644
(0.062)*** (0.065)*** (0.380)*** (0.244)*** (0.896)***
Ambig Av -0.021 -0.017 -0.006
(0.012)* (0.011) (0.118)
Controls No No No Yes Yes
Controls Interacted and Squared No No No No Yes
Time Dummies No No No Yes Yes
Number of Obs 13888 13853 13853 12477 12477
Number of Clusters 314 314 314 284 284
R-squared 0.133 0.123 0.096 0.166 0.116
Note: This table reports the results of OLS regressions (column 1) and IV regressions (columns 2-5).
The dependent variable is the total change in the log risky share xi;t. Change Pass Share in the
passive change in the log risky share xPi;t. In columns 2-6, the instrument is the zero-rebalancing
(log) passive change xIVi;t . Ambig Av* Change Pass Share is the interaction between Ambiguity
Aversion and xPi;t. In column 5, for each control variable, we include its interaction with x
P
i;t as
well its squared value. Controls include risk aversion, age, gender, education, marital status, income
and wealth. In column 5, controls include also the returns and the standard deviation of the returns
in percentage points. Robust standard errors, clustered at the individual level, are in brackets. ,
 and  denotes signicance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 7: Portfolio Rebalancing
Dep Variable Active Change
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Ambig Av * Pass Change -0.050 -0.048 -0.046 -0.044
(0.028)* (0.022)** (0.020)** (0.021)**
Passive Change -0.635 -0.472 -0.498 -0.49 -0.518
(0.025)*** (0.103)*** (0.081)*** (0.077)*** (0.079)***
Ambig Av 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Lagged Risky Share 0.043 0.064
(0.009)*** (0.014)***
Controls No No Yes Yes Yes
Time Dummies No No Yes Yes Yes
Number of Obs 30790 30790 27395 27394 14904
Number of Clusters 502 502 449 449 298
R-squared 0.414 0.417 0.457 0.464 0.540
Note: This table reports the results of OLS regressions. The dependent variable is the
active change in the risky share and Passive Change is the passive change in the risky share,
as dened in equation (5). Ambig Av * Pass Change is the interaction between Ambiguity
Aversion and Passive Change. Lagged risky share is the risky share in the previous month.
Controls include risk aversion, age, gender, education, marital status, income and wealth.
Robust standard errors, clustered at the individual level, are in brackets. ,  and 
denotes signicance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
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1 Ambiguity Aversion and Other Traits
Table 1: Ambiguity Aversion
Dep Variable Ambig Aversion
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dislike Uncertainty 0.096
(0.048)**
Risk Aversion -0.048
(0.043)
Compute Interest 0.104
(0.106)
Condent -0.009
(0.036)
Hyperbolic -0.144
(0.129)
Education 0.003 0.001 0.008 -0.002 0.002 0.005
(0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033)
Married -0.039 -0.037 -0.027 -0.038 -0.039 -0.033
(0.132) (0.132) (0.131) (0.132) (0.132) (0.132)
Age -0.159 -0.158 -0.157 -0.164 -0.162 -0.162
(0.076)** (0.076)** (0.076)** (0.076)** (0.077)** (0.076)**
Female -0.150 -0.144 -0.200 -0.133 -0.15 -0.138
(0.105) (0.105) (0.106)* (0.105) (0.105) (0.105)
Income 0.141 0.139 0.133 0.142 0.141 0.137
(0.046)*** (0.046)*** (0.046)*** (0.046)*** (0.046)*** (0.046)***
Wealth 0.043 0.040 0.042 0.041 0.043 0.044
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026)*
Observations 457 458 457 458 458 458
R-squared 0.069 0.072 0.076 0.071 0.069 0.072
Note: This table reports the results of OLS regressions. A detailed description of all the variables
appears in Section 8.1 in the main text. Robust standard errors are in brackets. ,  and 
denotes signicance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
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2 Robustness Checks
In Table 2, we collect our main results so as to facilitate the comparison; in
the subsequent tables we report the results of our tests.
Representativeness
As we only observe clientsbehaviors within the company, one may ques-
tion whether our e¤ects are informative about householdsbehaviors in their
overall portfolios. As a way to address this question, we exploit the informa-
tion collected in our survey on householdsnancial assets and total wealth,
and check whether the e¤ects of ambiguity and risk preferences are di¤erent
for those who have invested a lot vs. little of their wealth in the company.
We build the variable Fraction as the value of the portfolio held in the com-
pany as of August 2010 (around the time when the survey was conducted)
and the clients total wealth, which we estimate as the midpoint in the
reported interval.1 Fraction takes values between 0:01% and 67:8%, with
average equal to 10:3%. We rst observe that this fraction is not related
to ambiguity preferences. In Table 3, we observe that our estimates do not
vary systematically with the fraction of wealth invested in the company.
Delegated Portfolio Management and Fiscal Gains
The management of assurance vie contracts can be delegated. Clients
could mandate the company to automatically rebalance their contracts in
order to keep the fraction of uc funds relative to euro funds constant over
time (so as to fully compensate passive changes in the risky share); alterna-
tively, they could mandate the company to automatically increase the share
of euro funds in the portfolio (so as to turn to safer portfolios as the age of
retirement approaches). In both cases, automatic rebalancing is done once
per year and clients can freely opt in or out. In our sample, about 10% of the
clients have subscribed one such option in at least one of their contracts. We
rst observe that the propensity to opt in one these options is not related to
ambiguity preferences. We then replicate our main results omitting clients
who have opted for delegated management in at least one contract. Results
appear in Table 4, and show no signicant di¤erence with the results in the
main analysis.
Another distinct feature of assurance vie contracts is that clients benet
from reduced taxes on capital gains if they keep their contract for at least 8
years. While there should be no mechanical relation between tax advantages
and the patterns analyzed in our main analysis, we report here results for
the subsamples of clients who have no contract younger than 8 years. While
1For the highest interval, where clients report wealth of 1 million euros or above, we
consider the minimum of the interval. Results are insensitive to choosing other point
estimates within the range, the value of portfolios in nearby months, as well as the value
of the portfolio relative to the clients nancial assets.
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the sample size drops signicantly (to about half of the original sample), we
observe in Table 5 that our main results are not substantially a¤ected.
Other measures of ambiguity aversion and behavioral traits
We have constructed a dummy Ambig Averse which is equal to 1 if Ambig
Aversion is 4 (that is, if the subject prefers 1000 euros with 40% chance
than with unknown probability) and zero otherwise. Accordingly, 70% of
our subjects are coded as ambiguity averse. In Table 6, we revise our main
results by employing this alternative variable and observe that Ambig Averse
has very similar e¤ects to our main variable Ambig Aversion.
Our survey also contains questions with lotteries involving losses, and
based on these questions we can dene the 1-4 index Ambig Aversion(Loss).2
In Table 7, we observe that preferences over losses have a di¤erent impact,
but often not statistically signicant. The e¤ects of our main measures are
however unchanged.
The literature suggests that ambiguity preferences may be related to
behavioral traits such as sophistication, condence, and time preference.
While investigating the e¤ects of all these traits on portfolio choices remains
beyond the scope of the present analysis, we here take a more limited task
and show that our coe¢ cients of interest are not a¤ected by the inclusion
of these extra variables (see Table 8).
Standard Errors
Since we expect some persistence over time in household behaviors and
since our variable of interest Ambig Aversion varies by individuals and not
over time, we have clustered standard errors at the individual level in our
main analysis. The error structure we have in mind is one in which obser-
vations are independent in any given cross section but not necessarily so for
a given individual over time. To conrm the validity of this assumption,
we repeat our regressions on returns in Table 4 in the main text (column
1) without using the time dimension. We run a cross-sectional regression
in which the dependent variable is the average returns experienced by each
client over our sample period. We observe that our estimates are remarkably
in line with those reported in the main text (see column 3 of Table 10).
We also notice that this choice of clustering is rather conservative, it
would be easier to nd statistically signicant e¤ects by adopting di¤erent
specications. To see this, in Table 9, we report two alternative clustering
2Ambig Aversion(Loss) is based on: "You have two options: (a) lose 1000 euros with
a completely unknown probability vs. (b) lose 1000 euros with 50% chance and zero oth-
erwise." If (a) is chosen, (c) lose 1000 euros with unknown probability vs. (d) lose 1000
euros with 40% chance and zero otherwise. If (b) is chosen, (e) lose 1000 euros with
unknown probability vs. (f) lose 1000 euros with 60% chance and zero otherwise. The
variable takes values 1 if (a) and (c) are chosen, 2 if (a) and (d) are chosen, 3 if (b) and
(e) are chosen, and 4 if (b) and (f) are chosen.
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of standard errors. In columns 1-3, we cluster by time in order to account
for cross-sectional correlation of returns and show that standard errors are
considerably lower in this case. The e¤ect is even more dramatic when one
considers rather persistent behaviors such as risk taking. In columns 4-6,
we employ a double clustering by client and by time following the method
developed by Petersen (2009). We observe that our results are basically
unchanged.
Sample Selection
As mentioned in the main text, our analysis is based on a sample of clients
who had an assurance vie contract in the company at the end of 2010. These
contracts were opened at possibly di¤erent points in time, and this creates a
variation across clients in the number of periods in which they appear in our
sample.3 This variation is not random. For example, older clients are more
likely to have opened their account earlier and so to appear in our sample
for a longer period.
We do not believe however that survivorship bias is driving our results.
First, we are mostly exploiting the cross-sectional variation and not the time
series dimension in our data. Our estimates would in fact be very similar
(though sometimes less precise) if, instead of estimating equation (1), we
would run simple cross-sectional regressions using as dependent variable yi;
the sample average of yi;t. We report these estimates in Table 10 (columns
1-4).
Second, we can restrict our sample to those clients who appear for more
than 100 periods (the median duration in our sample). Of course, this is
an even more selected sample, but our coe¢ cients of interest are consistent
(though sometimes noisier) with those reported in the main analysis (see
Table 11).
Third, we can apply inverse probability weighting. Let si denote the
number of periods in which client i appears in our sample, X0i a set of
explanatory variables, Zi a set of auxiliary variables and let Xi  X0i [ Zi:
We dene the inverse probability weight as pi = s^0i =s^i; where s^i is the
predicted value of si given Xi and s^0i is the predicted value of si given X
0
i :
In our simplest specication, Zi includes the clients age, which is the main
determinant of si; and X0i includes all other demographic variables (gender,
education, marital status, income and wealth) as well as ambiguity and risk
aversion. In this way, pi applies larger weights to younger clients, whose
predicted probability to be included in the full sample is lower. Results of
weighted regressions are reported in Table 12, and they are very much in
line with those observed in the main analysis.
While this method only accounts for selection along observables, and
3The number of months for which our clients appear in the sample varies between 11
and 104, with mean equal to 78 and median equal to 100.
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one may question which variables should be included in X0i and Zi; our
estimates have proven robust across various specications. If anything, our
e¤ects become stronger as we consider additional auxiliary variables. We
believe that our baseline specications provide conservative estimates of our
coe¢ cients of interest.
Other specication tests
We have asked our subjects if their education, age, income and wealth
fall within pre-specied intervals. For simplicity, in our main analysis, we
have included the corresponding categorical variables as controls. There are
no strong reasons to impose that any change in these variables would have
the same e¤ect. As we show in Table 13, however, our results would be
unchanged if we were to add these controls as a series of dummy variables
instead.
We measure ambiguity attitudes at one point in time, towards the end
of our sample period. In order to explore whether the e¤ects we identify
are rather stable over time, we estimate our regressions by restricting to the
rst half of our sample period, from September 2002 to December 2006. As
shown in Table 14, estimates are noisier but comparable in magnitude to
our baseline specication.
Finally, while in Tables 2 and 3 in the main text we consider measures
of risk exposure based on past returns, investors may be forward-looking.
Accordingly, we build the standard deviation of their returns and their betas
using returns in the next 12 months (as opposed to returns in the past 12
months). As shown in Table 15, results are very similar to the ones reported
in our main analysis.
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Table 2: Main Results
Dep Variable Std Dev (F )  (W ) Returns Tot Change Act Change
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ambig Aversion 0.043 0.007 0.012 -0.042 -0.017 0.001
(0.019)** (0.002)*** (0.006)** (0.023)* (0.011) (0.002)
AvgRet*Ambig 0.142
(0.059)**
Ambig * Change Pass Share -0.241
(0.059)***
Change Pass Share 1.300
(0.244)***
Ambig * Pass Change -0.048
(0.022)**
Pass Change -0.498
(0.081)***
Number of Obs 34672 35578 31265 31265 12477 27395
Number of Clusters 457 457 456 456 284 449
R-squared 0.11 0.165 0.232 0.236 0.166 0.457
Note: This table reports the results of OLS regressions (columns 1-4 and 6) and IV regressions (column 5). In
column 1, the dependent variable is the standard deviation of the returns in the previous 12 months. In column
2, the dependent variable is the di¤erence between Beta(F) and Beta(W). Controls include the sum of Beta(F)
and Beta(W). In columns 3-4, the dependent variable is the monthly returns of the portfolio in percentage
points. Controls include the standard deviation, Beta(F), the skewness and the coskewness of the returns.
AvgRet is the average returns across all portfolios at time t. In column 5, the dependent variable is the total
change in the log risky share. Change Pass Share is the passive change in the log risky share. The instrument
is the zero-rebalancing (log) passive change. In column 6, the dependent variable is the active change in the
risky share. Passive Change is the passive change in the risky share. All regressions also include time xed
e¤ects and standard controls (risk aversion, age, gender, education, marital status, income and wealth). Robust
standard errors, clustered at the individual level, are in brackets. ,  and  denotes signicance at 10%, 5%
and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 3: Representativeness
Dep Variable Std Dev (F )  (W ) Returns Tot Change Act Change
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ambig Aversion 0.06 0.005 0.014 -0.051 0.001 0.003
(0.032)* (0.003)* (0.006)** (0.034) (0.017) (0.002)
Ambig*Fraction -0.191 0.021 -0.006 0.105 -0.106 -0.014
(0.17) (0.019) (0.004) (0.177) (0.075) (0.013)
Fraction 0.124 -0.101 0.021 0.134 0.347 0.06
(0.535) (0.058)* (0.015) (0.534) (0.265) (0.042)
AvgRet*Ambig 0.191
(0.085)**
AvgRet*Ambig*Fraction -0.457
(0.456)
Ambig *Change Pass Share -0.308
(0.070)***
Ambig*Change Pass*Fraction 0.077
(0.102)
Change Pass Share 1.452
(0.275)***
Ambig*Pass Change*Fraction 0.192
(0.118)
Ambig*Pass Change -0.065
(0.031)**
Passive Change -0.418
(0.164)**
Number of Obs 32700 33571 31003 29532 11502 25768
Number of Clusters 429 429 447 428 267 424
R-squared 0.123 0.175 0.233 0.245 0.167 0.466
Note: This table reports the results of OLS regressions (columns 1-4 and 6) and IV regressions (column 5).
Fraction is the value of the portfolio within the company over the total value of reported wealth. In column 1,
the dependent variable is the standard deviation of the returns in the previous 12 months. In column 2, the
dependent variable is the di¤erence between Beta(F) and Beta(W). Controls include the sum of Beta(F) and
Beta(W). In columns 3-4, the dependent variable is the monthly returns of the portfolio in percentage points.
Controls include the standard deviation, Beta(F), the skewness and the coskewness of the returns. AvgRet is
the average returns across all portfolios at time t. In column 4, AvgRet*Fraction is included. In column 5, the
dependent variable is the total change in the log risky share. Change Pass Share is the passive change in the log
risky share. The instrument is the zero-rebalancing (log) passive change. Change Pass Share*Fraction is also
included. In column 6, the dependent variable is the active change in the risky share. Passive Change is the
passive change in the risky share. Passive Change*Fraction is also included. All regressions also include time
xed e¤ects and standard controls (risk aversion, age, gender, education, marital status, income and wealth).
Robust standard errors, clustered at the individual level, are in brackets. ,  and  denotes signicance at
10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 4: Delegated Portfolio
Dep Variable Std Dev (F )  (W ) Returns Tot Change Act Change
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ambig Aversion 0.033 0.006 0.014 -0.024 -0.015 0.001
(0.019)* (0.002)*** (0.006)** (0.024) (0.012) (0.002)
AvgRet*Ambig 0.099
(0.059)*
Ambig * Change Pass Share -0.288
(0.062)***
Change Pass Share 1.455
(0.246)***
Ambig * Pass Change -0.058
(0.029)**
Pass Change -0.424
(0.104)***
Number of Obs 31215 31971 27927 27927 11477 24921
Number of Clusters 433 433 432 432 251 418
R-squared 0.069 0.12 0.203 0.205 0.185 0.369
Note: This table reports the results of OLS regressions (columns 1-4 and 6) and IV regressions (column
5). The sample is restricted to clients who have no contract with delegated management. In column 1, the
dependent variable is the standard deviation of the returns in the previous 12 months. In column 2, the
dependent variable is the di¤erence between Beta(F) and Beta(W). Controls include the sum of Beta(F) and
Beta(W). In columns 3-4, the dependent variable is the monthly returns of the portfolio in percentage points.
Controls include the standard deviation, Beta(F), the skewness and the coskewness of the returns. AvgRet
is the average returns across all portfolios at time t. In column 5, the dependent variable is the total change
in the log risky share. Change Pass Share is the passive change in the log risky share. The instrument is the
zero-rebalancing (log) passive change. In column 6, the dependent variable is the active change in the risky
share. Passive Change is the passive change in the risky share. All regressions also include time xed e¤ects
and standard controls (risk aversion, age, gender, education, marital status, income and wealth). Robust
standard errors, clustered at the individual level, are in brackets. ,  and  denotes signicance at 10%,
5% and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 5: Tax Advantage
Dep Variable Std Dev (F )  (W ) Returns Tot Change Act Change
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ambig Aversion 0.045 0.011 0.008 -0.035 -0.026 -0.001
(0.021)** (0.006)* (0.007) (0.026) (0.014)* (0.002)
AvgRet*Ambig 0.099
(0.059)*
Ambig * Change Pass Share -0.32
(0.047)***
Change Pass Share 1.494
(0.176)***
Ambig * Pass Change -0.127
(0.042)***
Pass Change -0.172
(0.154)
Number of Obs 16797 17058 15648 15648 6523 14813
Number of Clusters 262 263 258 258 153 259
R-squared 0.109 0.097 0.215 0.221 0.29 0.379
Note: This table reports the results of OLS regressions (columns 1-4 and 6) and IV regressions (column 5).
The sample is restricted to clients who have no contract younger than 8 years. In column 1, the dependent
variable is the standard deviation of the returns in the previous 12 months. In column 2, the dependent
variable is the di¤erence between Beta(F) and Beta(W). Controls include the sum of Beta(F) and Beta(W).
In columns 3-4, the dependent variable is the monthly returns of the portfolio in percentage points. Controls
include the standard deviation, Beta(F), the skewness and the coskewness of the returns. AvgRet is the
average returns across all portfolios at time t. In column 5, the dependent variable is the total change in
the log risky share. Change Pass Share is the passive change in the log risky share. The instrument is the
zero-rebalancing (log) passive change. In column 6, the dependent variable is the active change in the risky
share. Passive Change is the passive change in the risky share. All regressions also include time xed e¤ects
and standard controls (risk aversion, age, gender, education, marital status, income and wealth). Robust
standard errors, clustered at the individual level, are in brackets. ,  and  denotes signicance at 10%,
5% and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 6: Ambiguity Averse Dummy
Dep Variable Std Dev (F )  (W ) Returns Tot Change Act Change
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ambig Averse 0.119 0.016 0.02 -0.142 0.002 -0.05
(0.052)** (0.005)*** (0.014) (0.055)*** (0.004) (0.030)*
AvgRet*Ambig 0.423
(0.137)***
Ambig * Change Pass Share -0.502
(0.100)***
Change Pass Share 0.81
(0.109)***
Ambig * Pass Change -0.14
(0.062)**
Pass Change -0.543
(0.057)***
Number of Obs 34672 35578 31265 31265 27395 12477
Number of Clusters 457 457 456 456 449 284
R-squared 0.112 0.165 0.231 0.237 0.458 0.191
Note: This table reports the results of OLS regressions (columns 1-4 and 6) and IV regressions (column 5).
Ambig Averse is a dummy equal to 1 if Ambig Aversion is 4 and zero otherwise. In column 1, the dependent
variable is the standard deviation of the returns in the previous 12 months. In column 2, the dependent variable
is the di¤erence between Beta(F) and Beta(W). Controls include the sum of Beta(F) and Beta(W). In columns
3-4, the dependent variable is the monthly returns of the portfolio in percentage points. Controls include the
standard deviation, Beta(F), the skewness and the coskewness of the returns. AvgRet is the average returns
across all portfolios at time t. In column 5, the dependent variable is the total change in the log risky share.
Change Pass Share is the passive change in the log risky share. The instrument is the zero-rebalancing (log)
passive change. In column 6, the dependent variable is the active change in the risky share. Passive Change is
the passive change in the risky share. All regressions also include time xed e¤ects and standard controls (risk
aversion, age, gender, education, marital status, income and wealth). Robust standard errors, clustered at the
individual level, are in brackets. ,  and  denotes signicance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 7: Preferences over Losses
Dep Variable Std Dev (F )  (W ) Returns Tot Change Act Change
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ambig Aversion 0.044 0.007 0.011 -0.043 -0.015 0.001
(0.021)** (0.002)*** (0.006)** (0.023)* (0.012) (0.002)
Ambig(loss) -0.012 0.001 0.011 0.03 0.001 -0.001
(0.023) (0.002) (0.006)* (0.025) (0.011) (0.002)
AvgRet*Ambig 0.142
(0.058)**
AvgRet*Ambig(loss) -0.05
(0.064)
Ambig *Change Pass Share -0.218
(0.068)***
Ambig(loss)*Ch Pass Share 0.055
(0.030)*
Change Pass Share 0.999
(0.300)***
Ambig*Pass Change -0.05
(0.021)**
Ambig(loss)*Pass Change 0.017
(0.017)
Passive Change -0.537
(0.091)***
Number of Obs 34672 35578 31265 31265 12477 27395
Number of Clusters 457 457 456 456 284 449
R-squared 0.111 0.165 0.232 0.236 0.193 0.458
Note: This table reports the results of OLS regressions (columns 1-4 and 6) and IV regressions (column
5). Ambig(loss) is a measure of ambiguity aversion elicited with lotteries involving losses. In column 1, the
dependent variable is the standard deviation of the returns in the previous 12 months. In column 2, the
dependent variable is the di¤erence between Beta(F) and Beta(W). Controls include the sum of Beta(F) and
Beta(W). In columns 3-4, the dependent variable is the monthly returns of the portfolio in percentage points.
Controls include the standard deviation, Beta(F), the skewness and the coskewness of the returns. AvgRet is
the average returns across all portfolios at time t. In column 5, the dependent variable is the total change in
the log risky share. Change Pass Share is the passive change in the log risky share. The instrument is the
zero-rebalancing (log) passive change. In column 6, the dependent variable is the active change in the risky
share. Passive Change is the passive change in the risky share. All regressions also include time xed e¤ects and
standard controls (risk aversion, age, gender, education, marital status, income and wealth). Robust standard
errors, clustered at the individual level, are in brackets. ,  and  denotes signicance at 10%, 5% and 1%
level, respectively.
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Table 8: Other Traits
Dep Variable Std Dev (F )  (W ) Returns Tot Change Act Change
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ambig Aversion 0.041 0.01 0.012 -0.042 -0.016 0.001
(0.021)* (0.005)* (0.006)** (0.023)* (0.012) (0.002)
AvgRet*Ambig 0.141
(0.059)**
Ambig * Change Pass Share -0.261
(0.061)***
Change Pass Share 1.3
(0.244)***
Ambig * Pass Change -0.048
(0.022)**
Pass Change -0.498
(0.081)***
Compute Interest 0.068 0.015 0.013 0.013 -0.013 0.001
(0.051) (0.012) (0.017) (0.017) (0.025) (0.004)
Condent 0.014 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001
(0.02) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.009) (0.001)
Hyperbolic 0.013 0.001 -0.015 -0.014 0.002 -0.002
(0.057) (0.014) (0.016) (0.016) (0.03) (0.005)
Number of Obs 34672 35759 31265 31265 12477 27395
Number of Clusters 457 458 456 456 284 449
R-squared 0.113 0.13 0.232 0.236 0.166 0.457
Note: This table reports the results of OLS regressions (columns 1-4 and 6) and IV regressions (column
5). Compute Interest is a dummy equal to one if the subject could correctly compute compound interests.
Condent is a 1-7 index based the perception of whether nancial risk can be mastered. Hyperbolic is a
dummy equal to one if the subject reported hyperbolic time preferences. In column 1, the dependent variable
is the standard deviation of the returns in the previous 12 months. In column 2, the dependent variable is
the di¤erence between Beta(F) and Beta(W). Controls include the sum of Beta(F) and Beta(W). In columns
3-4, the dependent variable is the monthly returns of the portfolio in percentage points. Controls include the
standard deviation, Beta(F), the skewness and the coskewness of the returns. AvgRet is the average returns
across all portfolios at time t. In column 5, the dependent variable is the total change in the log risky share.
Change Pass Share is the passive change in the log risky share. The instrument is the zero-rebalancing (log)
passive change. In column 6, the dependent variable is the active change in the risky share. Passive Change is
the passive change in the risky share. All regressions also include time xed e¤ects and standard controls (risk
aversion, age, gender, education, marital status, income and wealth). Robust standard errors, clustered at the
individual level, are in brackets. ,  and  denotes signicance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 9: Clustering of Standard Errors
Dep Variable UC Share Monthly Returns UC Share Monthly Returns
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ambig Aversion 0.007 0.012 -0.042 0.007 0.012 -0.042
(0.001)*** (0.004)*** (0.009)*** (0.011) (0.006)** (0.024)*
Risk Aversion -0.006 -0.002 -0.002 -0.006 -0.002 -0.002
(0.001)*** (0.003) (0.003) (0.011) (0.006) (0.006)
AvgRet*Ambig 0.141 0.141
(0.013)*** (0.059)**
Number of Obs 35578 31265 31265 35578 31265 31265
Number of Clusters 104 103 103 104/457 103/456 103/456
R-squared 0.074 0.232 0.236 0.074 0.232 0.236
Note: This table reports the results of OLS regressions. In columns 1-3, standard errors are
clustered by time (month*year). In columns 4-6, standard errors are clustered by client and time
(double clustering). In columns 1 and 4, the dependent variable is the value of uc funds over
the total value of the portfolio. In columns 2,3,5 and 6, the dependent variable is the monthly
returns of the portfolio in percentage points. Controls include the standard deviation, Beta(F),
the skewness and the coskewness of the returns. AvgRet is the average returns across all portfolios
at time t. All regressions also include time xed e¤ects and standard controls (risk aversion, age,
gender, education, marital status, income and wealth). Robust standard errors are in brackets.
,  and  denotes signicance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 10: Sample Averages and Information Ratios
Dep Variable Avg Std Dev Avg (F )  (W ) Avg Monthly Returns IR (CAC40) IR (MSCI)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ambig Aversion 0.032 0.004 0.017 -0.325 0.003 0.003
(0.022) (0.002)* (0.007)** (0.179)* (0.001)** (0.001)**
AvgRet*Ambig 0.939
(0.447)**
Controls Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Time Dummies Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Number of Obs 457 457 486 434 33561 33561
Number of Clusters 457 457
R-squared 0.121 0.623 0.013 0.043 0.967 0.96
Note: This table reports the results of OLS regressions. In column 1, the dependent variable is the average
standard deviation of the returns of the client over the sample period. In column 2, the dependent variable is the
di¤erence between the average Beta(F) and the average Beta(W) of the client over the sample period. Controls
include the sum of the average Beta(F) and the average Beta(W). In columns 3-4, the dependent variable is the
average monthly returns of the client portfolio over the sample period. Controls include the average standard
deviation, average Beta(F), the average skewness and the average coskewness of the returns. AvgRet is the
average returns across all portfolios at time t. In column 5, the dependent variable is the information ratio
relative to the CAC40 index, dened as the ratio of the di¤erence between the monthly returns of the client
and that of CAC40 over the standard deviation of this di¤erence. In columns 6, the dependent variable is the
information ratio relative to the MSCI index, dened as the ratio of the di¤erence between the monthly returns
of the client and that of MSCI over the standard deviation of this di¤erence. Controls include risk aversion,
age, gender, education, marital status, income and wealth. Robust standard errors, clustered at the individual
level in columns 5-6, are in brackets. ,  and  denotes signicance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 11: Balanced Sample
Dep Variable Std Dev (F )  (W ) Returns Tot Change Act Change
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ambig Aversion 0.034 0.008 0.01 -0.029 -0.016 0.001
(0.023) (0.002)*** (0.007) (0.027) (0.013) (0.002)
AvgRet*Ambig 0.101
(0.066)
Ambig * Change Pass Share -0.302
(0.056)***
Change Pass Share 1.494
(0.228)***
Ambig * Pass Change -0.087
(0.039)**
Pass Change -0.305
(0.142)**
Number of Obs 23070 23495 21145 21145 9192 19649
Number of Clusters 232 232 232 232 155 232
R-squared 0.077 0.112 0.211 0.214 0.227 0.374
Note: This table reports the results of OLS regressions (columns 1-4 and 6) and IV regressions (column
5). The sample is restricted to clients who appear in the sample for more than 100 periods. In column
1, the dependent variable is the standard deviation of the returns in the previous 12 months. In column
2, the dependent variable is the di¤erence between Beta(F) and Beta(W). Controls include the sum of
Beta(F) and Beta(W). In columns 3-4, the dependent variable is the monthly returns of the portfolio in
percentage points. Controls include the standard deviation, Beta(F), the skewness and the coskewness of
the returns. AvgRet is the average returns across all portfolios at time t. In column 5, the dependent
variable is the total change in the log risky share. Change Pass Share is the passive change in the log
risky share. The instrument is the zero-rebalancing (log) passive change. In column 6, the dependent
variable is the active change in the risky share. Passive Change is the passive change in the risky share.
All regressions also include time xed e¤ects and standard controls (risk aversion, age, gender, education,
marital status, income and wealth). Robust standard errors, clustered at the individual level, are in
brackets. ,  and  denotes signicance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 12: Weighted Regressions
Dep Variable Std Dev (F )  (W ) Returns Tot Change Act Change
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ambig Aversion 0.043 0.007 0.013 -0.041 -0.018 0.001
(0.022)** (0.002)*** (0.006)** (0.024)* (0.011) (0.002)
AvgRet*Ambig 0.142
(0.061)**
Ambig * Change Pass Share -0.256
(0.061)***
Change Pass Share 1.276
(0.242)***
Ambig * Pass Change -0.046
(0.021)**
Pass Change -0.506
(0.080)***
Number of Obs 34672 35578 31265 31265 12477 27395
Number of Clusters 457 457 456 456 284 449
R-squared 0.114 0.171 0.235 0.239 0.163 0.462
Note: This table reports the results of Least Squares regressions (columns 1-4 and 6) and 2SLS regressions
(column 5) in which observations are weighted by inverse probability weights. In column 1, the dependent
variable is the standard deviation of the returns in the previous 12 months. In column 2, the dependent variable
is the di¤erence between Beta(F) and Beta(W). Controls include the sum of Beta(F) and Beta(W). In columns
3-4, the dependent variable is the monthly returns of the portfolio in percentage points. Controls include the
standard deviation, Beta(F), the skewness and the coskewness of the returns. AvgRet is the average returns
across all portfolios at time t. In column 5, the dependent variable is the total change in the log risky share.
Change Pass Share is the passive change in the log risky share. The instrument is the zero-rebalancing (log)
passive change. In column 6, the dependent variable is the active change in the risky share. Passive Change is
the passive change in the risky share. All regressions also include time xed e¤ects and standard controls (risk
aversion, age, gender, education, marital status, income and wealth). Robust standard errors, clustered at the
individual level, are in brackets. ,  and  denotes signicance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 13: Controls as Dummies
Dep Variable Std Dev (F )  (W ) Returns Tot Change Act Change
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ambig Aversion 0.042 0.008 0.014 -0.04 -0.02 0.001
(0.022)* (0.002)*** (0.006)** (0.024)* (0.012) (0.002)
AvgRet*Ambig 0.141
(0.059)**
Ambig * Change Pass Share -0.266
(0.060)***
Change Pass Share 1.317
(0.239)***
Ambig * Pass Change -0.047
(0.021)**
Pass Change -0.493
(0.080)***
Number of Obs 34672 35578 31265 31265 12477 27395
Number of Clusters 457 457 456 456 284 449
R-squared 0.144 0.171 0.233 0.237 0.176 0.462
Note: This table reports the results of OLS regressions (columns 1-4 and 6) and IV regressions (column 5). In
column 1, the dependent variable is the standard deviation of the returns in the previous 12 months. In column
2, the dependent variable is the di¤erence between Beta(F) and Beta(W). Controls include the sum of Beta(F)
and Beta(W). In columns 3-4, the dependent variable is the monthly returns of the portfolio in percentage
points. Controls include the standard deviation, Beta(F), the skewness and the coskewness of the returns.
AvgRet is the average returns across all portfolios at time t. In column 5, the dependent variable is the total
change in the log risky share. Change Pass Share is the passive change in the log risky share. The instrument
is the zero-rebalancing (log) passive change. In column 6, the dependent variable is the active change in the
risky share. Passive Change is the passive change in the risky share. All regressions also include time xed
e¤ects and standard controls (risk aversion, age, gender, education, marital status, income and wealth). For
age, education, income and wealth, we include a series of dummies variables instead of categorical variables as
in the baseline regressions. Robust standard errors, clustered at the individual level, are in brackets. ,  and
 denotes signicance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 14: Initial Sample Period
Dep Variable Std Dev (F )  (W ) Returns Tot Change Act Change
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ambig Aversion 0.046 0.004 0.015 -0.08 0.033 0.003
(0.024)* (0.002)* (0.009)* (0.039)** (0.015)** (0.002)*
AvgRet*Ambig 0.201
(0.079)**
Ambig * Change Pass Share -0.526
(0.200)***
Change Pass Share 2.301
(0.707)***
Ambig * Pass Change -0.071
(0.036)*
Pass Change -0.464
(0.135)***
Number of Obs 14137 14577 12812 12812 4370 9975
Number of Clusters 346 352 344 344 179 323
R-squared 0.084 0.196 0.212 0.217 0.176 0.449
Note: This table reports the results of OLS regressions (columns 1-4 and 6) and IV regressions (column
5). The sample is restricted to the rst half of our sample period, from September 2002 to December 2006.
In column 1, the dependent variable is the standard deviation of the returns in the previous 12 months. In
column 2, the dependent variable is the di¤erence between Beta(F) and Beta(W). Controls include the sum
of Beta(F) and Beta(W). In columns 3-4, the dependent variable is the monthly returns of the portfolio in
percentage points. Controls include the standard deviation, Beta(F), the skewness and the coskewness of the
returns. AvgRet is the average returns across all portfolios at time t. In column 5, the dependent variable is
the total change in the log risky share. Change Pass Share is the passive change in the log risky share. The
instrument is the zero-rebalancing (log) passive change. In column 6, the dependent variable is the active
change in the risky share. Passive Change is the passive change in the risky share. All regressions also include
time xed e¤ects and standard controls (risk aversion, age, gender, education, marital status, income and
wealth). Robust standard errors, clustered at the individual level, are in brackets. ,  and  denotes
signicance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 15: Future Variables
Dep Variable Std Dev Beta(F) Beta(F)-Beta(W)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ambig Aversion 0.056 0.049 0.013 0.01 0.009 0.007
(0.024)** (0.023)** (0.005)*** (0.005)** (0.003)*** (0.002)***
Beta(F)+Beta(W) 0.235
(0.014)***
Controls No Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Time Dummies No Yes No Yes Yes Yes
Number of Obs 39541 35272 40083 35759 35578 29842
Number of Clusters 511 458 511 458 457 450
R-squared 0.008 0.123 0.007 0.142 0.061 0.215
Note: This table reports the results of OLS regressions. In columns 1-2, the dependent variable
is the standard deviation of the returns in the next 12 months. In columns 3-4, the dependent
variable Beta(F) is obtained by regressing the returns in the next 12 months on the French
stock market index CAC40. In columns 5-6, the dependent is the di¤erence between Beta(F)
and Beta(W), which is obtained by regressing the returns in the next 12 months on the world
stock market index MSCI. In column 6, Beta(F)+Beta(W) is the sum of Beta(F) and Beta(W).
Controls include risk aversion, age, gender, education, marital status, income and wealth. Robust
standard errors, clustered at the individual level, are in brackets. ,  and  denotes signicance
at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
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